Vulnerability Scan Result

| Title: | Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam |
| Description: | Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, de brede inclusieve universiteit waar iedereen welkom is |
| ip_address | 52.232.69.102 |
| country | NL |
| network_name | Microsoft Corporation |
| asn | AS8075 |
80/tcp | http | nginx - |
443/tcp | https | nginx - |
| Software / Version | Category |
|---|---|
| Font Awesome | Font scripts |
| ZURB Foundation 6.7.5 | UI frameworks |
| core-js 3.19.3 | JavaScript libraries |
| Htmx | JavaScript libraries |
| jQuery 3.6.0 | JavaScript libraries |
| Open Graph | Miscellaneous |
| Quill | Rich text editors |
| Vue.js | JavaScript frameworks |
| reCAPTCHA | Security |
| Google Tag Manager | Tag managers |
| Lodash 4.17.21 | JavaScript libraries |
| HSTS | Security |
Web Application Vulnerabilities
Evidence
| CVE | CVSS | EPSS Score | EPSS Percentile | Summary |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-4800 | 8.1 | 0.00038 | 0.11564 | Impact: The fix for CVE-2021-23337 (https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-35jh-r3h4-6jhm) added validation for the variable option in _.template but did not apply the same validation to options.imports key names. Both paths flow into the same Function() constructor sink. When an application passes untrusted input as options.imports key names, an attacker can inject default-parameter expressions that execute arbitrary code at template compilation time. Additionally, _.template uses assignInWith to merge imports, which enumerates inherited properties via for..in. If Object.prototype has been polluted by any other vector, the polluted keys are copied into the imports object and passed to Function(). Patches: Users should upgrade to version 4.18.0. Workarounds: Do not pass untrusted input as key names in options.imports. Only use developer-controlled, static key names. |
| CVE-2025-13465 | 6.9 | 0.00029 | 0.08545 | Lodash versions 4.0.0 through 4.17.22 are vulnerable to prototype pollution in the _.unset and _.omit functions. An attacker can pass crafted paths which cause Lodash to delete methods from global prototypes. The issue permits deletion of properties but does not allow overwriting their original behavior. This issue is patched on 4.17.23 |
| CVE-2026-2950 | 6.5 | 0.00025 | 0.07294 | Impact: Lodash versions 4.17.23 and earlier are vulnerable to prototype pollution in the _.unset and _.omit functions. The fix for (CVE-2025-13465: https://github.com/lodash/lodash/security/advisories/GHSA-xxjr-mmjv-4gpg) only guards against string key members, so an attacker can bypass the check by passing array-wrapped path segments. This allows deletion of properties from built-in prototypes such as Object.prototype, Number.prototype, and String.prototype. The issue permits deletion of prototype properties but does not allow overwriting their original behavior. Patches: This issue is patched in 4.18.0. Workarounds: None. Upgrade to the patched version. |
Vulnerability description
Outdated or vulnerable software components include versions of server-side software that are no longer supported or have known, publicly disclosed vulnerabilities. Using outdated software significantly increases the attack surface of a system and may allow unauthorized access, data leaks, or service disruptions. Vulnerabilities in these components are often well-documented and actively exploited by attackers. Without security patches or vendor support, any weaknesses remain unmitigated, exposing the application to risks. In some cases, even after patching, the reported version may remain unchanged, requiring manual verification.
Risk description
The risk is that an attacker could search for an appropriate exploit (or create one himself) for any of these vulnerabilities and use it to attack the system. Since the vulnerabilities were discovered using only version-based testing, the risk level for this finding will not exceed 'high' severity. Critical risks will be assigned to vulnerabilities identified through accurate active testing methods.
Recommendation
In order to eliminate the risk of these vulnerabilities, we recommend you check the installed software version and upgrade to the latest version.
Classification
| CWE | CWE-1035 |
| OWASP Top 10 - 2017 | |
| OWASP Top 10 - 2021 |
Evidence
| URL | Evidence |
|---|---|
| https://vu.nl/nl | Response headers do not include the Referrer-Policy HTTP security header as well as the |
Vulnerability description
We noticed that the target application's server responses lack the Referrer-Policy HTTP header, which controls how much referrer information the browser will send with each request originated from the current web application.
Risk description
The risk is that if a user visits a web page (e.g. "http://example.com/pricing/") and clicks on a link from that page going to e.g. "https://www.google.com", the browser will send to Google the full originating URL in the `Referer` header, assuming the Referrer-Policy header is not set. The originating URL could be considered sensitive information and it could be used for user tracking.
Recommendation
The Referrer-Policy header should be configured on the server side to avoid user tracking and inadvertent information leakage. The value `no-referrer` of this header instructs the browser to omit the Referer header entirely.
Classification
| CWE | CWE-693 |
| OWASP Top 10 - 2017 | |
| OWASP Top 10 - 2021 |
Evidence
| Software / Version | Category |
|---|---|
| Font Awesome | Font scripts |
| ZURB Foundation 6.7.5 | UI frameworks |
| core-js 3.19.3 | JavaScript libraries |
| Htmx | JavaScript libraries |
| jQuery 3.6.0 | JavaScript libraries |
| Open Graph | Miscellaneous |
| Quill | Rich text editors |
| Vue.js | JavaScript frameworks |
| reCAPTCHA | Security |
| Google Tag Manager | Tag managers |
| Lodash 4.17.21 | JavaScript libraries |
| HSTS | Security |
Vulnerability description
We noticed that server software and technology details are exposed, potentially aiding attackers in tailoring specific exploits against identified systems and versions.
Risk description
The risk is that an attacker could use this information to mount specific attacks against the identified software type and version.
Recommendation
We recommend you to eliminate the information which permits the identification of software platform, technology, server and operating system: HTTP server headers, HTML meta information, etc.
Classification
| CWE | CWE-200 |
| OWASP Top 10 - 2017 | |
| OWASP Top 10 - 2021 |
Evidence
| URL | Evidence |
|---|---|
| https://vu.nl/nl | Response does not include the HTTP Content-Security-Policy security header or meta tag |
Vulnerability description
We noticed that the target application lacks the Content-Security-Policy (CSP) header in its HTTP responses. The CSP header is a security measure that instructs web browsers to enforce specific security rules, effectively preventing the exploitation of Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerabilities.
Risk description
The risk is that if the target application is vulnerable to XSS, lack of this header makes it easily exploitable by attackers.
Recommendation
Configure the Content-Security-Header to be sent with each HTTP response in order to apply the specific policies needed by the application.
Classification
| CWE | CWE-1021 |
| OWASP Top 10 - 2017 | |
| OWASP Top 10 - 2021 |
Evidence
Vulnerability description
We found the robots.txt on the target server. This file instructs web crawlers what URLs and endpoints of the web application they can visit and crawl. Website administrators often misuse this file while attempting to hide some web pages from the users.
Risk description
There is no particular security risk in having a robots.txt file. However, it's important to note that adding endpoints in it should not be considered a security measure, as this file can be directly accessed and read by anyone.
Recommendation
We recommend you to manually review the entries from robots.txt and remove the ones which lead to sensitive locations in the website (ex. administration panels, configuration files, etc).
Evidence
Vulnerability description
We have noticed that the server is missing the security.txt file, which is considered a good practice for web security. It provides a standardized way for security researchers and the public to report security vulnerabilities or concerns by outlining the preferred method of contact and reporting procedures.
Risk description
There is no particular risk in not having a security.txt file for your server. However, this file is important because it offers a designated channel for reporting vulnerabilities and security issues.
Recommendation
We recommend you to implement the security.txt file according to the standard, in order to allow researchers or users report any security issues they find, improving the defensive mechanisms of your server.
Classification
| CWE | CWE-1188 |
| OWASP Top 10 - 2017 | |
| OWASP Top 10 - 2021 |
Evidence
| URL | Method | Parameters | Evidence |
|---|---|---|---|
| https://vu.nl/nl/agenda/2026/foundations-of-mindfulness | GET | Headers: User-Agent=Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/108.0.0.0 Safari/537.36 Cookies: VuWeb.AF=CfDJ8O6dSgzdEAhBkJbEnOXOojv_5GyNHAoG9Wg0QJI-Z1zoBACcrBMOJoYtPoaDnL1KMNeUI3R5hR5ezFaJn8IcNktvA9pIHJqBLwDAVMdapfBfcubDEccj7q4mm8dcfF-oY... | Email Address: newconnective@vu.nl |
| https://vu.nl/nl/agenda/2026/gebruik-de-formatieve-dialoog-voor-betrokken-onderwijs | GET | Headers: User-Agent=Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/108.0.0.0 Safari/537.36 | Email Address: s.k.arens@vu.nl |
| https://vu.nl/nl/nieuws/2026/meike-bartels-benoemd-tot-lid-van-de-knaw | GET | Headers: User-Agent=Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/108.0.0.0 Safari/537.36 Cookies: VuWeb.AF=CfDJ8O6dSgzdEAhBkJbEnOXOojv_5GyNHAoG9Wg0QJI-Z1zoBACcrBMOJoYtPoaDnL1KMNeUI3R5hR5ezFaJn8IcNktvA9pIHJqBLwDAVMdapfBfcubDEccj7q4mm8dcfF-oY... | Email Address: pers@vu.nl |
Vulnerability description
We noticed that this web application exposes email addresses, which might be unintended. While not inherently a vulnerability, this information could be leveraged in social engineering or spam related activities.
Risk description
The risk is that exposed email addresses within the application could be accessed by unauthorized parties. This could lead to privacy violations, spam, phishing attacks, or other forms of misuse.
Recommendation
Compartmentalize the application to have 'safe' areas where trust boundaries can be unambiguously drawn. Do not allow email addresses to go outside of the trust boundary, and always be careful when interfacing with a compartment outside of the safe area.
Classification
| CWE | CWE-200 |
| OWASP Top 10 - 2017 | |
| OWASP Top 10 - 2021 |
Infrastructure Vulnerabilities
Evidence
| DKIM selector | Key type | Key size | Value |
|---|---|---|---|
| rsa | 546 | "v=DKIM1; k=rsa; " "p=MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAj6ioYM9HC3cRhPWGSVtli2jPZpmsxRqzmaHIY0F8oGnGbyJ" "io1lsniCZs5MXhfdKdpyiktmNB+p+4nyktpM+hg8iR526WpUOt0y6/QKiGjlgVRiNm/yEMNNXCKrIN0" "fXk+Qz1b47xKV6heJb4qI+2/J2PYWL6/tCQOtTdL6fvaXbSbGzIbwPEozNLMKoK0XJpmAsfrWR5ew33" "FPgngq6bcN5RBW3QGiV5qpM6OBl5H1ftEZ0QTNXppfziy/uMdONlmCwG3Kop5psxKTWaLKZFxQbfpd8o" "ecSQ5uVtsnt3N+fiWw1RZK4mGzjTqA2TMZJubS4Mdq0tf2GCJZnDpcBHwIDAQAB" |
Vulnerability description
We found that the DKIM key length is under 1024-bit. When a DKIM (DomainKeys Identified Mail) key length is under 1024-bit, it is considered weak by modern cryptographic standards. Shorter key lengths, such as 512 or 768 bits, are vulnerable to brute-force attacks, where an attacker could potentially forge a valid DKIM signature for a domain. This undermines the entire purpose of DKIM, which is to authenticate email messages and prevent email spoofing by verifying that the message headers have not been tampered with. A DKIM key under 1024 bits significantly reduces the difficulty for attackers to break the signature.
Risk description
The primary risk of using a DKIM key with fewer than 1024 bits is that it weakens the domain's email authentication security, making it more susceptible to brute-force attacks. If an attacker successfully forges a DKIM signature, they can impersonate legitimate senders and send fraudulent or phishing emails that appear authentic to the recipient. This can lead to financial losses, reputational damage, and an increased risk of targeted attacks, as recipients are more likely to trust emails that pass DKIM verification.
Recommendation
We recommend using a DKIM key with a length of at least 1024 bits. Ideally, 2048-bit keys should be used, as they provide a higher level of security and are more resistant to brute-force attacks. Organizations should regularly audit their DKIM configurations and rotate cryptographic keys periodically to maintain security. In addition, any DKIM keys that are less than 1024 bits should be immediately replaced with stronger keys to prevent exploitation.
Evidence
| DKIM selector | Key type | Key size | Value |
|---|---|---|---|
| rsa | 354 | "v=DKIM1;h=sha256;k=rsa;" "p=MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAmoujo+bQ61no0Lx KotrUvr0fKwt6ux29TcE5bkLMtrULHX+cMDjK+ZdHzOMFIf4o3nXl+tiyp/FFOReB5Ln6MwJTAvAAmQ35jtw/vf iqyj4T+97K60smIVSTHtdLJ9zzjbrd0cCdTmc12rb8VOZZC9CON4Lmbm9qVavjqFXRzzBcnTGQFsl297QhV7itA GARrwL3EMuST1L0B7" "keBW3gApzyZLyz1ABc35XGBD7RbTrdVNc+ZHBnPhaMpebDih04eiNj3HpjjxEsHPf8UB 3fkxK6dZh5COFqeVfxpce0WWiKoGGO+5RhF6iic6/ijNfsHpvjqVt+T500xMHT1jF33wIDAQAB" |
Vulnerability description
We found that the DKIM key length is under 1024-bit. When a DKIM (DomainKeys Identified Mail) key length is under 1024-bit, it is considered weak by modern cryptographic standards. Shorter key lengths, such as 512 or 768 bits, are vulnerable to brute-force attacks, where an attacker could potentially forge a valid DKIM signature for a domain. This undermines the entire purpose of DKIM, which is to authenticate email messages and prevent email spoofing by verifying that the message headers have not been tampered with. A DKIM key under 1024 bits significantly reduces the difficulty for attackers to break the signature.
Risk description
The primary risk of using a DKIM key with fewer than 1024 bits is that it weakens the domain's email authentication security, making it more susceptible to brute-force attacks. If an attacker successfully forges a DKIM signature, they can impersonate legitimate senders and send fraudulent or phishing emails that appear authentic to the recipient. This can lead to financial losses, reputational damage, and an increased risk of targeted attacks, as recipients are more likely to trust emails that pass DKIM verification.
Recommendation
We recommend using a DKIM key with a length of at least 1024 bits. Ideally, 2048-bit keys should be used, as they provide a higher level of security and are more resistant to brute-force attacks. Organizations should regularly audit their DKIM configurations and rotate cryptographic keys periodically to maintain security. In addition, any DKIM keys that are less than 1024 bits should be immediately replaced with stronger keys to prevent exploitation.
Evidence
| DKIM selector | Key type | Key size | Value |
|---|---|---|---|
| mandrill | rsa | 408 | "v=DKIM1; k=rsa; p=MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQCrLHiExVd55zd/IQ/J/mRwSRMAocV/" "hMB3jXwaHH36d9NaVynQFYV8NaWi69c1veUtRzGt7yAioXqLj7Z4TeEUoOLgrKa" "sn8YnckGs9i3B3tVFB+Ch/4mPhXWiNfNdynHWBcPcbJ8kjEQ2U8y78dHZj1YeRXXVvWob2OaKynO8/lQIDAQAB;" |
Vulnerability description
We found that the DKIM key length is under 1024-bit. When a DKIM (DomainKeys Identified Mail) key length is under 1024-bit, it is considered weak by modern cryptographic standards. Shorter key lengths, such as 512 or 768 bits, are vulnerable to brute-force attacks, where an attacker could potentially forge a valid DKIM signature for a domain. This undermines the entire purpose of DKIM, which is to authenticate email messages and prevent email spoofing by verifying that the message headers have not been tampered with. A DKIM key under 1024 bits significantly reduces the difficulty for attackers to break the signature.
Risk description
The primary risk of using a DKIM key with fewer than 1024 bits is that it weakens the domain's email authentication security, making it more susceptible to brute-force attacks. If an attacker successfully forges a DKIM signature, they can impersonate legitimate senders and send fraudulent or phishing emails that appear authentic to the recipient. This can lead to financial losses, reputational damage, and an increased risk of targeted attacks, as recipients are more likely to trust emails that pass DKIM verification.
Recommendation
We recommend using a DKIM key with a length of at least 1024 bits. Ideally, 2048-bit keys should be used, as they provide a higher level of security and are more resistant to brute-force attacks. Organizations should regularly audit their DKIM configurations and rotate cryptographic keys periodically to maintain security. In addition, any DKIM keys that are less than 1024 bits should be immediately replaced with stronger keys to prevent exploitation.
Evidence
| Domain Queried | DNS Record Type | Description | Value |
|---|---|---|---|
| vu.nl | SPF | Sender Policy Framework | "v=spf1 include:_spf.vu.nl include:spf.protection.outlook.com include:_spf.x-com.nl include:spf.coachview.net include:outboundmail.blackbaud.net ip4:194.150.14.85 include:spf.formdesk.com ip4:89.146.30.0/27 ip4:213.144.242.0/28 ~all" |
Vulnerability description
We found that the Sender Policy Framework (SPF) record for the domain is configured with ~all (soft fail), which indicates that emails from unauthorized IP addresses are not explicitly denied. Instead, the recipient mail server is instructed to treat these messages with suspicion but may still accept them. This configuration may not provide enough protection against email spoofing and unauthorized email delivery, leaving the domain more vulnerable to impersonation attempts.
Risk description
The ~all directive in an SPF record allows unauthorized emails to pass through some email servers, even though they fail SPF verification. While such emails may be marked as suspicious or placed into a spam folder, not all mail servers handle soft fail conditions consistently. This creates a risk that malicious actors can spoof the domain to send phishing emails or other fraudulent communications, potentially causing damage to the organization's reputation and leading to successful social engineering attacks.
Recommendation
We recommend changing the SPF record's ~all (soft fail) directive to -all (hard fail). The -all setting tells recipient mail servers to reject emails from any IP addresses not listed in the SPF record, providing stronger protection against email spoofing. Ensure that all legitimate IP addresses and services that send emails on behalf of your domain are properly included in the SPF record before implementing this change.
Evidence
| DKIM selector | Key type | Key size | Value |
|---|---|---|---|
| rsa | 354 | "v=DKIM1;h=sha256;k=rsa;" "p=MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAmoujo+bQ61no0Lx KotrUvr0fKwt6ux29TcE5bkLMtrULHX+cMDjK+ZdHzOMFIf4o3nXl+tiyp/FFOReB5Ln6MwJTAvAAmQ35jtw/vf iqyj4T+97K60smIVSTHtdLJ9zzjbrd0cCdTmc12rb8VOZZC9CON4Lmbm9qVavjqFXRzzBcnTGQFsl297QhV7itA GARrwL3EMuST1L0B7" "keBW3gApzyZLyz1ABc35XGBD7RbTrdVNc+ZHBnPhaMpebDih04eiNj3HpjjxEsHPf8UB 3fkxK6dZh5COFqeVfxpce0WWiKoGGO+5RhF6iic6/ijNfsHpvjqVt+T500xMHT1jF33wIDAQAB" |
Vulnerability description
We found that the DKIM record uses common selectors. The use of common DKIM selectors such as default, test, dkim, or mail may indicate a lack of proper customization or key management. Attackers often target domains using such selectors because they suggest that the domain is relying on default configurations, which could be less secure and easier to exploit. This can increase the risk of DKIM key exposure or misuse.
Risk description
Using a common DKIM selector makes it easier for attackers to predict and exploit email authentication weaknesses. Attackers may attempt to find corresponding DKIM keys or improperly managed records associated with common selectors. If a common selector is coupled with a weak key length or poor key management practices, it significantly increases the likelihood of email spoofing and phishing attacks.
Recommendation
We recommend using unique, customized selectors for each DKIM key to make it more difficult for attackers to predict and target the domain's DKIM records. Regularly rotate selectors and associated keys to further strengthen the security of your domain's email authentication infrastructure.
Evidence
| Domain Queried | DNS Record Type | Description | Value |
|---|---|---|---|
| _dmarc.vu.nl | TXT | Text record | "v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; sp=quarantine; pct=100; rua=mailto:8e35bdd774d9724@rep.dmarcanalyzer.com; ruf=mailto:8e35bdd774d9724@for.dmarcanalyzer.com; fo=0:1:d:s;" |
Vulnerability description
We found that the target uses p=quarantine in the DMARC policy. When a DMARC policy is set to p=quarantine, emails that fail DMARC validation are delivered but placed in the recipient’s spam or junk folder. Although it offers some protection, this policy is less strict than p=reject, which blocks such emails entirely.
Risk description
While emails failing DMARC validation are sent to the spam folder, users may still retrieve them from there, leading to a higher risk of phishing and spoofing attacks succeeding. Moreover, less strict enforcement may allow more fraudulent emails to reach user inboxes if misclassified.
Recommendation
We recommend considering moving to a stricter policy, such as p=reject, where emails that fail DMARC validation are completely rejected rather than delivered to spam folders. This reduces the risk of users interacting with potentially malicious emails.
Evidence
| Domain Queried | DNS Record Type | Description | Value |
|---|---|---|---|
| vu.nl | A | IPv4 address | 52.232.69.102 |
| vu.nl | NS | Name server | new-ns1.vu.nl |
| vu.nl | NS | Name server | new-ns2.vu.nl |
| vu.nl | MX | Mail server | 0 vu-nl.mail.protection.outlook.com |
| vu.nl | SOA | Start of Authority | new-ns1.vu.nl. hostmaster.vu.nl. 2024251278 10800 1080 2419200 900 |
| vu.nl | TXT | Text record | "MS=ms11195063" |
| vu.nl | TXT | Text record | "MS=ms33278211" |
| vu.nl | TXT | Text record | "Phone: +31 20 5985385" |
| vu.nl | TXT | Text record | "HARICA-2AQWWJAqj5VSqkz0rOX" |
| vu.nl | TXT | Text record | "Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam" |
| vu.nl | TXT | Text record | "ZOOM_verify_gOlFjB0bTXauhCZZfZ0SZA" |
| vu.nl | TXT | Text record | "935e51b8-957b-486c-bca0-52db87534023" |
| vu.nl | TXT | Text record | "B8RKMH5ZV1ICEXRNIUXA04C1D4UXWARTPQE3T8PTL" |
| vu.nl | TXT | Text record | "apple-domain-verification=CQxBk5H2cH0MlovF" |
| vu.nl | TXT | Text record | "HO5Hae8DJUssBXMJPxF8SuoTVyO4suOdM/31NLC0WwA=" |
| vu.nl | TXT | Text record | "Address: De Boelelaan 1105, 1081 HV Amsterdam" |
| vu.nl | TXT | Text record | "jamf-site-verification=mTKqAuu3KFc2rfzUgyBWng" |
| vu.nl | TXT | Text record | "bw=JD9O8B5T3N8rye1GFjQP5tlEtsH7SuVOiTWPxSNk67Kr" |
| vu.nl | TXT | Text record | "facebook-domain-verification=z5lo4vme7tj7rz0rkrjeyw3ficdkrt" |
| vu.nl | TXT | Text record | "google-site-verification=5wBwCtzHALiL0eFj_8LfcLtC9A0pwqF8ChcfKHGWeUg" |
| vu.nl | TXT | Text record | "cEePUaAdUpgbDwN8y+iChaM5q/fmwZ98byweLOwQQTzlfZ7ZqiRmUZy9plWcraR+SpUS7soZ99JhnT3uRkW0uA==" |
| vu.nl | TXT | Text record | "atlassian-domain-verification=4DKZByaje8L/OfqPKIBr9eFCxXWL7x17aQeSAH5OE0dv32q8PXT/ibb45DBX6h1T" |
| vu.nl | TXT | Text record | "successfactors-site-verification=NDVmYTkwNzVjMjQ3NDgwYTRiNTZiYjM4YWY0MjUwNjE4NDE1NzAyYjVkZDAxYzU4ZDBkNWNiMjg5OTFkYTYxYg==" |
| vu.nl | SPF | Sender Policy Framework | "v=spf1 include:_spf.vu.nl include:spf.protection.outlook.com include:_spf.x-com.nl include:spf.coachview.net include:outboundmail.blackbaud.net ip4:194.150.14.85 include:spf.formdesk.com ip4:89.146.30.0/27 ip4:213.144.242.0/28 ~all" |
| vu.nl | CAA | Certificate Authority Authorization | 0 iodef "mailto:socc@vu.nl" |
| vu.nl | CAA | Certificate Authority Authorization | 0 issue "digicert.com" |
| vu.nl | CAA | Certificate Authority Authorization | 0 issue "harica.gr" |
| vu.nl | CAA | Certificate Authority Authorization | 0 issue "letsencrypt.org" |
| vu.nl | CAA | Certificate Authority Authorization | 0 issue "pki.goog; cansignhttpexchanges=yes" |
| vu.nl | CAA | Certificate Authority Authorization | 0 issuewild "harica.gr" |
| _dmarc.vu.nl | TXT | Text record | "v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; sp=quarantine; pct=100; rua=mailto:8e35bdd774d9724@rep.dmarcanalyzer.com; ruf=mailto:8e35bdd774d9724@for.dmarcanalyzer.com; fo=0:1:d:s;" |
Risk description
An initial step for an attacker aiming to learn about an organization involves conducting searches on its domain names to uncover DNS records associated with the organization. This strategy aims to amass comprehensive insights into the target domain, enabling the attacker to outline the organization's external digital landscape. This gathered intelligence may subsequently serve as a foundation for launching attacks, including those based on social engineering techniques. DNS records pointing to services or servers that are no longer in use can provide an attacker with an easy entry point into the network.
Recommendation
We recommend reviewing all DNS records associated with the domain and identifying and removing unused or obsolete records.
Evidence
| Software / Version | Category |
|---|---|
| reCAPTCHA | Security |
| HSTS | Security |
| Google Tag Manager | Tag managers |
Vulnerability description
We noticed that server software and technology details are exposed, potentially aiding attackers in tailoring specific exploits against identified systems and versions.
Risk description
The risk is that an attacker could use this information to mount specific attacks against the identified software type and version.
Recommendation
We recommend you to eliminate the information which permits the identification of software platform, technology, server and operating system: HTTP server headers, HTML meta information, etc.
Evidence
| Operating System | Accuracy |
|---|---|
| Linux 4.0 | 88% |
Vulnerability description
OS Detection
Evidence
| DKIM selector | Key type | Key size | Value |
|---|---|---|---|
| rsa | 546 | "v=DKIM1; k=rsa; " "p=MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAj6ioYM9HC3cRhPWGSVtli2jPZpmsxRqzmaHIY0F8oGnGbyJ" "io1lsniCZs5MXhfdKdpyiktmNB+p+4nyktpM+hg8iR526WpUOt0y6/QKiGjlgVRiNm/yEMNNXCKrIN0" "fXk+Qz1b47xKV6heJb4qI+2/J2PYWL6/tCQOtTdL6fvaXbSbGzIbwPEozNLMKoK0XJpmAsfrWR5ew33" "FPgngq6bcN5RBW3QGiV5qpM6OBl5H1ftEZ0QTNXppfziy/uMdONlmCwG3Kop5psxKTWaLKZFxQbfpd8o" "ecSQ5uVtsnt3N+fiWw1RZK4mGzjTqA2TMZJubS4Mdq0tf2GCJZnDpcBHwIDAQAB" | |
| k1 | rsa | 1296 | "k=rsa; p=MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQDbNrX2cY/GUKIFx2G/1I00ftdAj713WP9AQ1xir85i89sA2guU0ta4UX1Xzm06XIU6iBP41VwmPwBGRNofhBVR+e6WHUoNyIR4Bn84LVcfZE20rmDeXQblIupNWBqLXM1Q+VieI/eZu/7k9/vOkLSaQQdml4Cv8lb3PcnluMVIhQIDAQAB;" |
| rsa | 354 | "v=DKIM1;h=sha256;k=rsa;" "p=MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAmoujo+bQ61no0Lx KotrUvr0fKwt6ux29TcE5bkLMtrULHX+cMDjK+ZdHzOMFIf4o3nXl+tiyp/FFOReB5Ln6MwJTAvAAmQ35jtw/vf iqyj4T+97K60smIVSTHtdLJ9zzjbrd0cCdTmc12rb8VOZZC9CON4Lmbm9qVavjqFXRzzBcnTGQFsl297QhV7itA GARrwL3EMuST1L0B7" "keBW3gApzyZLyz1ABc35XGBD7RbTrdVNc+ZHBnPhaMpebDih04eiNj3HpjjxEsHPf8UB 3fkxK6dZh5COFqeVfxpce0WWiKoGGO+5RhF6iic6/ijNfsHpvjqVt+T500xMHT1jF33wIDAQAB" | |
| mandrill | rsa | 408 | "v=DKIM1; k=rsa; p=MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQCrLHiExVd55zd/IQ/J/mRwSRMAocV/" "hMB3jXwaHH36d9NaVynQFYV8NaWi69c1veUtRzGt7yAioXqLj7Z4TeEUoOLgrKa" "sn8YnckGs9i3B3tVFB+Ch/4mPhXWiNfNdynHWBcPcbJ8kjEQ2U8y78dHZj1YeRXXVvWob2OaKynO8/lQIDAQAB;" |
| mandrill | rsa | 1296 | "v=DKIM1; k=rsa; p=MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQCrLHiExVd55zd/IQ/J/mRwSRMAocV/hMB3jXwaHH36d9NaVynQFYV8NaWi69c1veUtRzGt7yAioXqLj7Z4TeEUoOLgrKsn8YnckGs9i3B3tVFB+Ch/4mPhXWiNfNdynHWBcPcbJ8kjEQ2U8y78dHZj1YeRXXVvWob2OaKynO8/lQIDAQAB;" |
| selector1 | rsa | 1296 | "v=DKIM1; k=rsa; p=MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQC9Gsq/XPYYxdtfH4SUf/qsDtw3aB4Hfm7s2NOXDMA+4DUFxBO1Yg84aSgI2H2+ABxRo4fzPXig79aWQ+oG9lt05bY934fFTQOG+lNv5Kr6fXl5yaRvMDJek5srJynaLspxVt8PtEVPXl/zTyvgjvm1zb6Apjjp6N55Oegz/6CoJwIDAQAB; n=1024,1449226675,1" "465037875" |
| selector2 | rsa | 1422 | "v=DKIM1; k=rsa; p=MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEApuyY1cHEb7nEl2K88+ngRi189S7RfXWvgGWOZjJ/qOeu/7vYcFnSDGqdg3+znvXnuscV4/S5L0q1Ll3x++6tUlRL9IqgpIZdARTt2/faMPD6wTKdepJO5/UhfnhhAo7FbzUhHC4WGEpUG0vPseN4bE41wBI9JN/iGVonVHN6S/2wAd9cC49LSJh2ADEtbZ73/" "+QmuJ78KmWbPKWJysRRmBjWGKcDz/zCr2NaQx9+OahEjDNhLIFClgREhIyGrASjUud0FoamXnvyKuXRMl1owipfnmY3ri4kl382fqP9UHUmVzPWE0eK6ycfFSRDJS4GbAIGFOFRCBc55wRJv9EzcQIDAQAB;" |
| sm | rsa | 1296 | "v=DKIM1; k=rsa; p=MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQC3cxQ4ktkwFqXWhvk3cr6XMw9AFz/OcOuukemZqoj0s0avqoBaop9WoSvv8C+63hGhy/SCNnmgpLdgzET/fvgmw8mZuy1pR/mis8nUHnbJtZCwakoOuSjnHqfztYawUuBDY6Ue7D//sBWiFcx8pwh6EHwdZ3ghtWheXT2lfapHPwIDAQAB" |
